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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has the largest and fastest growing drug market in the
world, and the demand for generic drugs is steadily growing.1 The pharmaceutical
industry is responsible for over three million American jobs, and pharmaceutical
companies invest millions of dollars in promoting the research and development
of new and generic drugs.2 In order to retain their competitive advantage, most
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers seek patent protection.3 Manufacturers have
learned to think creatively, using a variety of patents—including method,
design—and research tool patents—in order to fully protect their lucrative
inventions.
Congress encourages biomedical research and technological
innovation through the patent system.4 Congress heavily regulates the
pharmaceutical industry both directly through status such as the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act5 and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act),6 and indirectly through
regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).7 Several
volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations are specifically dedicated to
describing what manufacturers must do in order to market a drug in the United
States.8
Due to recent congressional legislation and judicial decisions, however,
generic drug manufacturers have lost some previously afforded patent
protections,9 specifically with respect to their bioequivalency test method
patents. For example, the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act
allows competing drug manufacturers to “borrow” information within the
patents of their competitors so long as they agree to use the patents in
furtherance of submitting information to the FDA.10 Competing generic drug
manufacturers, for example, can take bioequivalency tests disclosed in the
1 The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, SELECTUSA.GOV, http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-s
napshots/pharmaceutical-and-biotech-industries-united-states (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).
2 Id.
3 Getting Generic Drugs Q & A, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/artic
les/0063-generic-drugs-and-low-cost-prescriptions (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
4 JOSEPH MILLER & LYDIA LOREN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
118 (Ver. 3.1 2013).
5 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
6 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
7 21 C.F.R. § 1 (2013).
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.).
10 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2013).
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applications of their competitors and use the tests to manufacturer their own
generic drugs. A bioequivalency test is a method of testing a generic drug that
proves that it is equivalent to a name brand drug that has already received FDA
approval. All generic drug applications must demonstrate bioequivalency, thus
the tests are extremely valuable. Unfortunately, bioequivalency testing methods
can be very costly and time consuming to develop, so generic manufacturers
patent the tests in an effort to protect them from use by competitors. The safe
harbor provision has thus thwarted the protection scheme on which generic
manufacturers depended.
The Federal Circuit recently expanded the scope of the safe harbor
provision in 2012 in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.11 A majority of the Federal Circuit in Momenta held that via the safe harbor
provision, competing generic pharmaceutical manufacturers could use each
other’s patented bioequivalency testing methods for pre-clinical research and
manufacturing without incurring infringement liability.12 In 2003, Amphastar
became the first generic manufacturer to submit an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) to the FDA to market Enoxaparin, a generic version of
the name brand drug Lovenox, which is used to prevent blood clots.13 As a
result of submitting the ANDA, Aventis, the manufacturer of Lovenox, sued
Amphastar; after several years of expensive patent litigation, the FDA granted
Amphastar’s ANDA, allowing it to manufacture enoxaparin.14 In the
meantime, however, before the FDA granted Amphastar’s ANDA for
enoxaparin, Momenta “borrowed” Amphastar’s bioequivalency test, which was
publicly disclosed in Amphastar’s ANDA and used the test to beat Amphastar
to the market by more than a year.15 This one year boost resulting from
“borrowing” Amphastar’s patent for bioequivalency allowed Momenta a
monopoly on the generic market, resulting in profits of over $260 million per
quarter.16
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s holding in Momenta threatens
manufacturers with a devastating loss of previously available patent protection
for measuring the bioequivalency of generic drugs. The Note concludes that
trade secret law is the best alternative to patent protection until Congress
decides to narrow the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s safe harbor provision.
Due to the high cost of submitting a New Drug Application or an ANDA to
11
12
13
14
15
16

Momenta Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the FDA, generic drug manufacturers want to seek protection for their
bioequivalency tests so that consumers can reap the benefits of competition. In
other words, giving generic manufacturers the ability to protect their
bioequivalency tests would incentivize the production of generic drugs, which
would in turn benefit consumers. However, in light of Momenta, this protection
is no longer available through patent law.17 Additionally, the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision has frustrated the
generic drug manufacturer’s ability to protect its research and development
investments. Fortunately, a solution exists for generic drug manufacturers who
wish to shield their tests and methods for bioequivalency from the hungry eyes
of their competitors. Despite the numerous regulations governing disclosure of
information submitted to the FDA, including most notably the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), generic drug manufacturers, using a heightened
degree of care, can protect bioequivalency tests as trade secrets.
Part II of this Note first describes the FDA’s method of regulating generic
drugs, including the process of submitting an ANDA, to demonstrate why this
process is important to the patent protection which Momenta has recently
frustrated for manufacturers. This section then explains how some of the
information submitted to the FDA in furtherance of the ANDA can be
protected through trade secret law instead of through patent law.
Part II next reviews the relevant parts of the Hatch-Waxman Act and
specifically focuses on the evolution of the safe harbor provision, codified at 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Moreover, this Part explores prior United States Supreme
Court opinions leading up to Momenta which have interpreted the safe harbor
provision and demonstrates that the scope of the safe harbor provision has
been expanded to such an extent that protection via method patents for
bioequivalency tests is no longer available.
Additionally, Part II summarizes the current state of trade secret law and
demonstrates how a bioequivalency test could qualify as a trade secret. This
part also discusses the four potential threats of disclosure that a bioequivalency
test trade secret could face, including FOIA requests, FDA use, and litigation;
related threats, including the common law right of public access and discovery
requests.
Part III argues that trade secret law is not only available to generic
manufacturers but is ultimately a better alternative to protecting bioequivalency
tests than patent law. Part III demonstrates how generic manufacturers can
overcome threats of disclosure of their trade secrets presentation FOIA
requests, FDA use and disclosure, and litigation.
17

Id. at 1362.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. FDA SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERIC DRUGS

Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938, Congress delegated to
the FDA the power to enact specific regulations concerning requirements for
marketing new and generic drugs.18 A new drug or generic bioequivalent may
not be placed on the market without prior FDA approval.19 The process for
gaining FDA approval is quite extensive, so this Note only discusses the most
relevant and important requirements relating to generic drugs.
First, in order to gain FDA approval to manufacture a generic drug, the
manufacturer must submit an ANDA. The application must be within one of
the FDA’s delineated categories of acceptable drug products.20 ANDAs may be
submitted for “[d]rug products that are bioequivalent, or the same as a listed
[i.e. name brand] drug. For determining the suitability of an [ANDA], the term
‘same as’ means identical in active ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, route of
administration, and conditions of use.”21 Within sixty days of receiving an
ANDA, the FDA will conduct a preliminary review of the application to
determine whether it may be filed.22 If the filing of an application is permitted,
the party can submit it, and the FDA will then either send an approval of the
application or deny it within 180 days of submission.23
A central requirement for a successful ANDA is that the generic drug must
be the bioequivalent of the listed (i.e., name brand) drug.24 A bioequivalency
test is defined as “[i]nformation that shows that the drug product is
bioequivalent to the reference listed drug upon which the applicant relies.”25 In
other words, rather than submitting a New Drug Application, a manufacturer
who wants to produce a generic version of an already existing drug proves in its
ANDA that the generic is the same as the name brand drug; as a result, generic
drug manufacturers are not required to demonstrate safety or efficacy of the
drug in their ANDA, since these were already demonstrated in the application
of the original manufacturer.26 Bioequivalency tests are thus of critical
P.L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
21 C.F.R. § 314.105(a) (2013).
20 Id. § 314.92(a).
21 Id. § 314.92(a)(1). For more on the requirements for the acceptable types of drug products,
see id. §§ 314.92(a)(1), 314.122.
22 Id. § 314.101(a)(1).
23 Id. § 314.100(a).
24 Id. § 314.94(a)(7).
25 Id. § 314.94(7)(i).
26 See supra note 1.
18
19
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importance to ANDAs, and even the analytical and statistical methods used in
determining bioequivalency are subjected to FDA regulation.27
In addition, a completed ANDA form must contain the following parts: a
table of contents; a basis for submission (meaning the application must refer to
a listed drug); the conditions under which the drug can be used; the drug’s
active ingredients (which must be the same as the active ingredients in the listed
drug); the route of administration, strength, and dosage form of the drug (which
must be the same as those in the listed drug); bio-equivalence (discussed further
below); the labeling and proposed labeling for the drug; the chemistry,
manufacturing process, and controls of the drug; any drug samples requested by
the FDA; any patent certifications used in the manufacture of the drug; and a
statement of financial certification or disclosure.28 Additionally, “[a] complete
study report must be submitted for the bioequivalence study upon which the
applicant relies for approval.”29 As discussed in Part III, the FDA may freely
use the information that it receives in an ANDA, and the FDA, like other
Federal Agencies, has a broad disclosure policy, meaning that the FDA allows
the public to obtain Agency information whenever appropriate.30
Once a method for determining bioequivalency is established, generic drugs
can be quickly and more easily produced because the drug manufacturers can
demonstrate that the generic is the same as the listed drug, which has already
extensively tested by the FDA. Generic competitors thus have a great incentive
to steal these bioequivalency testing methods in order to accelerate the process
of submitting an ANDA. Because the process of developing a bioequivalency
test can be expensive and time consuming, generic drug manufacturers need
assurance that the tests will receive some type of protection in order to
incentivize their development.31 Given the breadth of information, time, and
money required to submit an ANDA, generic manufacturers seek patent
protection in order to make their investments worthwhile.

27 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(7)(iii); see also id. §§ 56.104, 56.105 (providing exceptions to normal IRB
requirements).
28 Id. §§ 314.94(a)(1)–(12).
29 Id. § 314.94(7)(i).
30 See infra text accompanying note 162 and discussion that follows.
31 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(plaintiff patent holder sought enforcement of its method patent for a bioequivalency test); Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.) (involving a similar
fact pattern).
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B. THE SCOPE OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

In order to demonstrate the breath of the problem that the Federal Circuit’s
ruling in Momenta v. Amphastar has caused, this section discusses how the FDA’s
regulations regarding generic drugs intersect with the Hatch-Waxman Act. The
relationship between the Hatch-Waxman Act and RDA regulations is critical
for understanding why the Federal Circuit’s holding in Momenta frustrated the
usefulness of patent protection for bioequivalency research and development.
In order to fully understand the goals and problems of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
it is first helpful to review the history which led to the statute’s enactment.
Before the Hatch-Waxman Act became effective in September of 1984,
there were no statutory provisions to protect pharmaceutical companies from a
competitor’s allegations of patent infringement when they used another’s
patented technology to perform pre-approval clinical research.32 Congress
enacted the Act’s safe harbor provision “to establish that experimentation with
a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity
which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement.”33
The Act specifically overruled the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Roche Prods. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.34 Roche held that a competing drug manufacturer
infringes by using a competitor’s patent for pre-clinical research because
borrowing patented information for research purposes falls outside of the scope
of the experimental use rule,35 which “ends with an actual reduction to
The Federal Circuit declared, “[w]e cannot construe the
practice.”36
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the
guise of scientific inquiry, when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not
insubstantial commercial purposes.”37 This precedent left no protection to
pharmaceutical companies alleged to infringe by competitors when they used
another’s patented technology to perform FDA pre-approved clinical research.
The safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act,38 now clarifies:
Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) (quoting Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar
Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Rader, C.J., dissenting)).
34 Id. pt. 2, at 27.
35 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 863. The experimental use rule is “an experiment with a patented
article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement
[and] is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.” Id. at 862 (internal quotations omitted)
(internal citations omitted).
36 Nordberg Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1252, 1285 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
37 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 863.
38 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984).
32
33
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It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell,
or sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.39
Since the passage of the statute, the Supreme Court has interpreted its meaning
fairly expansively.40 This Note will next briefly summarize the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the safe harbor provision, leading to the Federal Circuit’s
most recent expansion in Momenta.
The controversy over the scope of the safe harbor provision began early in
the statute’s history; the Supreme Court first interpreted the safe harbor
provision only six years after it was enacted in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.41
Eli Lilly concerned whether the safe harbor provision applied to patented
medical devices in addition to prescription drugs.42 The Supreme Court
broadened the application of the statute to not only to drug patents, but also to
medical devices.43 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reached this
expansive holding by citing the Act’s purpose according to the legislative history
“to respond to two unintended distortions on the 17-year patent term produced
by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket regulatory
approval.”44 According to the majority, Congress designed the safe harbor
provision to prevent the patentee from having an extended monopoly on the
market simply by virtue of the amount of time it takes another company to
produce a bioequivalent drug.45 The majority additionally argued that the
statute “allows competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in
otherwise infringing activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval.”46

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
See 496 U.S. at 665 (finding no infringement under § 271(e)(1) in the case of a patented
medical device); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (holding that
the use of a patented compound was protected by § 271(e)(1) as long as it was reasonable to
believe that the compound tested could be submitted to the FDA at some later time and the
experiments for which the compound was used would produce information relevant to an
application).
41 496 U.S. 661.
42 Id. at 663.
43 Id. at 665.
44 Id. at 669.
45 Id. at 672–73.
46 Id. at 671.
39
40
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However, Justices Kennedy and White dissented, arguing the safe harbor
provision should not apply to anything beyond obtaining market approval for a
drug, and that the statute should not apply to “all” products regulated by the
FDA.47 Justice Kennedy explained that the testing of medical devices should
not be protected by the safe harbor because Congress could not have intended
for such an extraordinary meaning of the specific language in the statute.48
In 2005, the Supreme Court again interpreted the scope of the safe harbor
provision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd.49 Merck posed the
question of whether a manufacturer could use patented inventions during
preclinical research under the immunity of the safe harbor provision when the
results were not actually submitted to the FDA.50 Justice Scalia delivered a
short, and probably too informal, unanimous opinion, holding that the safe
harbor provision’s exception to infringement:
[N]ecessarily includes preclinical studies of patented compounds
that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory
process. There is simply no room in the statute for excluding
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase
of research in which it is developed or the particular submission
in which it could be included.51
Thus, the Merck Court again widened the scope of the safe harbor provision.
Following suit, the Federal Circuit further expanded the safe harbor
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in Momenta v. Amphastar. The issue in
Momenta was whether the defendant generic manufacturer lawfully used the
plaintiff competitor’s patented test for bioequivalency to test its own form of
the generic drug Enoxaparin.52 Defendant Amphastar argued that it did not
infringe because it used the plaintiff’s patent to test their own version of the
generic drug Enoxaparin and submitted these test results to the FDA, therefore
falling within the scope of the safe harbor.53 The court agreed with the
defendant that its use of momenta’s bioequivalency test for Enoxaparin was
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law”; and thus was permissible under the safe
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 202.
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1352–53.
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harbor provision.54 The majority relied primarily on the text of the statute to
support its position, arguing specifically that the phrase ‘under a federal law’
“extend[ed] beyond just the ‘most barebones information’ required by the FDA,
and instead encompass[ed] all ‘materials the FDA demands in the regulatory
process.’ ”55 Chief Judge Rader, however, relied on congressional purpose to
dictate a different result.56
In a strong dissent, Chief Judge Rader argued that Amphastar’s actions
exceeded the scope of the safe harbor provision because Amphastar used
Momenta’s patent for more than the mere submission of information to the
FDA.57 In his view, “Amphastar stepped in and took Momenta’s patented
invention without permission and used it to manufacture each commercial
batch [of Enoxaparin] it sells on the market.”58 Additionally, the fact that
Amphastar could only compete with Momenta by using its patent strengthened
Chief Judge Rader’s conclusion that the safe harbor provision should be more
limited in scope.59 In reaching this conclusion, Chief Judge Rader relied on
legislative history to support his argument that Congress did not intend to give
manufacturers the right to use another’s patented process to place a competing
drug on the market,60 and criticized the majority for totally ignoring it.61 The
safe harbor provision, he noted, was a congressional compromise because of its
limited scope in time, quantity, and type.62 The time period covered by the safe
harbor was only for pre-market approval; in other words, after the FDA
approves the drug, the safe harbor provision does not protect further marketing
activities.63 In terms of the safe harbor provision’s limitations on quantity and
type, Chief Judge Rader explained that the statute “only applies to
experimentation—and therefore would have limited impact on the patentee’s
exclusivity during the life of the patent.”64 In all, Chief Judge Rader concluded
that the safe harbor provision did not protect Amphastar from its use of
Id. at 1353 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
Id. at 1356 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1683
(2012)).
56 Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1362–63 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984)).
61 Id. at 1366.
62 Id. at 1365 (citing Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3605 Before the Subcom. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 696 (1984)
(letter from Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1365–66 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984)).
54
55
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Momenta’s patented bioequivalency test because Amphastar continued to use
the test after it gained FDA approval, thus destroying Momenta’s right to
exclude.65 As he lamented, “This result will render worthless manufacturing
test method patents.”66
Chief Judge Rader reached this fear that test method patents would no
longer offer protection to patent holders by considering the implications of the
majority’s holding.67 He argued that the majority of the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit have interpreted the safe harbor provision so broadly as to allow
competitors to use patented testing methods not just for pre-clinical research
but also for manufacturing.68 Patents exist to define the exclusion rights of
their holders,69 but the exclusion rights in this scenario have been all but
snatched away, presenting a problem for generic drug manufacturers who spend
millions of dollars developing tests to determine bioequivalency, and then seek
to protect these tests from the hungry eyes of their competitors.
C. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PATENT PROTECTION

In order to understand what generic manufacturers have lost by their
inability to protect their bioequivalency tests via patent law, this section briefly
reviews the protection that manufacturers would receive from patents absent
the Momenta v. Amphastar holding. Patent law’s origin rests in the United States
Constitution,70 which has been codified to protect “any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof” that is invented or discovered.71 In order to receive
patent protection for an invention falling within one of these eligible categories,
one must disclose his or her invention to the Patent Trademark Office (PTO)72
and meet the other statutory requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.73
Patent law’s scheme of protection of information via this disclosure process
could be seen as the opposite of trade secret protection, which attempts to
retain the value of information by protecting it against public disclosure.74

65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
Id. at 1361. See also Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 1953 (2005).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 117.
35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 27.
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Assuming that all the requirements for a valid patent are met,75 the patentee
receives protection for his or her invention for a period of twenty years.76
During this time, the patentee holds an exclusive right to use the patented
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.77 In the context of
bioequivalency testing methods of pharmaceutical drugs testing, the applicable
patent eligible category is “process.” Therefore, this Note proceeds referring
solely to “process” patents, also known as method patents.
If a patentee discovers that another entity is performing its patented process,
the patentee can sue this competitor for infringement.78 If a court finds that the
competitor infringes, the patentee is entitled to monetary damages and/or an
injunction.79 Overall, patent protection is bent towards protection for an
invention via disclosure of that invention,80 unlike trade secret protection,
discussed below, which affords protection for inventions by keeping them a
secret.81
D. A LOOK AT THE STATE OF TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE POTENTIAL
THREATS OF DISCLOSURE

A generic manufacturer need not register its bioequivalency test as a trade
secret, but in order to qualify for trade secret protection, a bioequivalency test
must meet the legal definition of a “trade secret.”82 This part examines several
common definitions of “trade secret,” which will be used in Part III to
demonstrate how a bioequivalency test fits within the scope of protectability.
This section also briefly introduces the ways in which a bioequivalency test
protected by trade secret law can be disclosed, including through a FOIA
request, FDA use, discovery requests, and the common law right of public
access.
Although trade secret law originally evolved under state common law, the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),83 was created to make state trade secret law
more homogenous and has been adopted by all but three states.84 The
75 For more information on the requirements for a valid patent, see id. at 129–54. See also 35
U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.
76 35 U.S.C. § 187.
77 Id. § 254.
78 See id. § 255.
79 Id. §§ 277–278.
80 Id. § 118.
81 Id. § 27.
82 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 27.
83 Unif. Trade Secrets Act (1979) (amended 1985).
84 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 28.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/8

12

Rogers: Trade Secret Rising: Protecting Equivalency Test Research and Dev

2014]

TRADE SECRET RISING

221

following discussion refers to the UTSA as adopted by New Jersey, a state
home to a large percentage of the United States’ drug manufacturers.85
The New Jersey UTSA outlines the definition of a ‘trade secret’ and the
circumstances under which a trade secret can be misappropriated:
“[T]rade secret” means information, held by one or more people,
without regard to form, including a formula . . . method . . .
technique . . . or process that: (1) derives independent economic
value . . . from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and is the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.86
The UTSA thus provides direction to generic drug manufacturers seeking to
protect their bioequivalency testing methods via trade secret law. However,
each manufacturer should look at the specific adoption of the UTSA in their
state in order to fully understand the scope of the trade secret protection
offered.87
In addition to the UTSA, the FDA also promulgates rules and regulations
regarding trade secrets, so is important for generic manufacturers to keep the
FDA’s definition of “trade secret” in mind when submitting their ANDAs.88
Because the FDA receives a great deal of information from generic drug
manufacturers, disclosure of this information to the public is of high
importance to a manufacturer seeking protection. The FDA’s provisions
regarding the protection of submitted information strikingly states that “[t]he
[FDA] will make the fullest possible disclosure of records to the public,
consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, the property rights of
persons in trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information.”89 It continues: “Except where specifically exempt pursuant to the

85 Pharmaceuticals, STATE OF NEW JERSEY BUSINESS PORTAL, http://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/in
dustry/pharmaceutical/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
86 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-2 (West 2012).
87 With the exception of Massachusetts and New York, each state has adopted some form of
the UTSA. While the laws are similar, it is helpful to refer to a state’s specific version of the
UTSA as a measure of precaution. For a full list of each state’s UTSA law, see Trade Secrets Laws:
State Law, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUITCLIFF, LLP, http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secretswatch/trad e-secrets-laws/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
88 See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2013).
89 Id. § 20.20(a).
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provisions of this part, all FDA records shall be made available for public
disclosure.”90
Due to the FDA’s proclivity towards disclosure of information, the FDA’s
definition of “trade secret” is essential for the protection of information.91
Courts have grappled with how expansively to construe the definition,92 which
reads:
A trade secret may consist of any commercially valuable plan,
formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can
be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial
effort. There must be a direct relationship between the trade
secret and the productive process.93
Because requests for information made under the FOIA are a common way
in which information known by the FDA can be disclosed, generic
manufacturers will likely want to know whether trade secrets that are submitted
to the FDA as a part of an ANDA could be disclosed by a FOIA request.94
The Freedom of Information Act first became effective in 1967, and controls
the public disclosure of previously unreleased information from federal
agencies.95 The primary purpose of the FOIA is to enable the public to access
government records in order to gain a greater understanding of the
government.96 FOIA disclosures include everything from substantive and
procedural rules regarding disclosure of information,97 administrative case law
reporting,98 and statements of policy and agency interpretations.99 Perhaps the
most controversial part of FOIA is found in section 3:

Id. § 20.20(b).
Id. § 20.61(a) (“The Food and Drug Administration will make the fullest possible disclosure
of records to the public, consistent with the rights of persons in trade secrets and confidential
commercial or financial information, and the need for the agency to promote frank internal policy
deliberations and to pursue its regulatory activities without disruption.”).
92 See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
93 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a).
94 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1967) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
95 What is FOIA, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
96 Id.
97 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2012).
98 Id. § 552(a)(2)(A).
99 Id. § 552(a)(2)(B).
90
91
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Except with respect to the records made available under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, and except as provided
in subparagraph (E), each agency, upon any request for records
which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in
accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if
any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person.100
The agency must also perform a reasonable search to find the information101
and must provide the information in the format requested.102 Like many other
federal agencies, the FDA has its own Freedom of Information A
ct Office, called the Food and Drug Administration Division of Freedom of
Information,103 wherein a person who is seeking information from the FDA
must submit a request.104
Although the FOIA attempts to make as much agency information available
to the public as possible, there are some exceptions to what information a
petitioner can receive. For example, agencies may withhold information that is
labeled confidential for the purposes of national security by an executive order,105
information that is solely related to agency personnel rules,106 and information
that is “exempted from disclosure by statute.”107 For information to be exempt
by a specific statute, the statute must be clear as to what type of information may
be withheld108 and must cite to the FOIA, in limited circumstances.109 Finally,
exceptions to FOIA also exist for “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,”110 agency
memorandums,111 and medical/personnel files.112 Although an exemption exists

Id. § 552(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Id. § 552(a)(3)(C).
102 Id. § 552(a)(3)(B).
103 21 C.F.R. § 20.30(a) (2013).
104 Id. § 20.30(b).
105 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012).
106 Id. § 552(b)(2).
107 Id. § 552(b)(3) (to be exempted, the statute in question must “(i) require[ ] that the matters
be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii)
establish[ ] particular criteria for withholding or refer[ ] to particular types of matters to be
withheld; and (B) . . . specifically cite [ ] to this paragraph.” (id. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii); (B))).
108 Id. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).
109 Id. § 552(b)(3)(B).
110 Id. § 552(b)(4).
111 Id. § 552(b)(5).
112 Id. § 552(b)(6).
100
101
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for trade secrets, manufacturers will have concerns that their bioequivalency tests,
which are worth millions of dollars, may not fit within the scope of protection.
Hypothetically, if a generic manufacturer were to choose to protect its
bioequivalency test via trade secret law, a competitor could try to access the test
information by submitting a FOIA request for it. Anyone who wishes to
request information from the FDA must submit a FOIA request in writing to
the FDA’s headquarters in Maryland.113 The writing must reasonably set forth
the information being requested.114 So long as the writing reasonably details the
information sought, “[e]very reasonable effort shall be made by the [FDA] to
assist in the identification and location of the records sought.”115 The person
submitting the request must also pay a fee, the amount of which is determined
by the type of information requested.116 If the confidentiality of requested
information is uncertain, the FDA will contact the entity who submitted the
information and/or who will “be affected by its disclosure before determining”
whether to disclose the information.117
If the FDA rejects a request for information, “the decision constitutes final
agency action that is subject to judicial review.”118 The person requesting the
information will be notified of the FDA’s rejection and will then have five days
after receipt of notification to file a suit in a United States District Court.119
When trade secret information is requested and disclosure is denied,120 the FDA
will inform the person who submitted the record that he or she must come and
defend the record’s confidentiality in court.121 The statute reads, “If the
affected person fails to intervene to defend the exempt status of the
records . . . the [FDA] will take this failure into consideration in deciding
whether that person has waived such exemption so as to require the [FDA] to
promptly make the records available for public disclosure.”122 Thus, the FDA
expects the person who submits information classified as a trade secret to
defend this status if it is challenged. While defending the trade secret status is
not mandatory under the statute, it factors into the FDA’s decision of whether
or not to disclose the information.123
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

21 C.F.R. § 20.40(a) (2013).
Id. § 20.40(b).
Id. § 20.40(b)(2).
See id. § 20.45(a)(1)–(3).
Id. § 20.47.
Id. § 20.48.
Id.
Disclosures are denied under 21 C.F.R. § 20.61.
21 C.F.R. § 20.55.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, even if a generic manufacturer meets the FDA’s definition of trade
secret when submitting an ANDA and the FDA’s disclosure of the information
via a FOIA request is limited, both the common law right of public access124
and discovery requests125 pose additional threats for generic manufacturers who
wish to protect their trade secrets. The common law right of public access can
arise during or after a lawsuit and poses a threat to generic manufacturers’
ability to protect bioequivalency tests, as courts strive to maintain open records
of judicial proceedings. The Second Circuit explains in Nycomed US, Inc. v.
Glenmark Generics, Inc., that the right of public access allows open access to
judicial documents to provide information to the public in hopes of making the
courts appear more legitimate.126 For the purposes of this Note, the definition
of “judicial documents” is particularly relevant because as the Second Circuit
declared in Lugosh v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, judicial documents are presumed to
be open to public access, as described in Part III.127
In Stern v. Cosby, the Second Circuit additionally developed a three-part test
to determine whether a judicial document is subject to the common law right of
public disclosure.128 “First, the court must determine whether the documents
are indeed judicial documents . . . Second, if the documents are judicial
documents, the court must determine the weight of the presumption [of
disclosure]. . . . Third, once the weight of the presumption is determined, a
court must balance competing considerations against it.”129 Altogether the right
of public access threatens disclosure of trade secrets. However, a generic
manufacturer can successfully argue that bioequivalency tests disclosed in
ANDAs should not be subject to the common law right of public access.130
Likewise, discovery requests also pose a threat to generic manufacturers who
could protect their bioequivalency tests as trade secrets. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not contain an absolute privilege for trade secrets that are
requested during discovery,131 but Rules 26 and 45 can help generic
See, e.g., Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
See, e.g., Massey Coal Services, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 249 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. W. Va.
2008).
126 Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023 (CBA), 2010.
127 435 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404,
409 (1st Cir. 1987)) (“[R]elevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of
competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies.”).
128 Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
129 Id. (quoted in Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788
(E.D.N.Y.) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130 See infra notes 196–208.
131 See generally Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
124
125

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2014

17

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 8

226

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 22:209

manufacturers to protect their bioequivalency test trade secrets from disclosure
during litigation. Rule 26 provides a scenario in which a party may receive a
protective order from the court in order to guard against the disclosure of a
trade secret132: “The motion must include a certification that the movant has in
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an
effort to resolve the dispute without court action.”133 Then, the rule states, “the
court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by
several following methods.134 One of the following ways to protect a party
includes: “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in
a specific way.”135 Because any relevant evidence will lend a presumption of
admissibility, the party seeking protection has the burden of proof that the
information should not be disclosed.136 Thus, although there is no per se
protection of trade secrets in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,137 generic
manufacturers could use Rule 26 and case law relating to discovery and the
common law right of public access to argue that their bioequivalency tests
protected as trade secrets should not be disclosed.
Like Rule 26, Rule 45 also helps ensure that trade secrets are not wrongfully
disclosed during discovery by protecting trade secrets from subpoenas. A
subpoena is an order from a government agency, usually a court, which compels
a witness to testify or produce evidence.138 In relevant part, Rule 45 states, “To
protect a person subject to or affected by a subpoena, the court for the district
where compliance is required may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if
it requires: (i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information. . . .”139 Subsequent case law has
stated that when a court is deciding whether to quash a subpoena which seeks
information marked as a trade secret, “a court must evaluate all the
circumstances and balance, inter alia, the requesting party’s need for the
information and the potential prejudice imposed on the requested party.”140
Furthermore, the factors to be balanced include “the relevance of the discovery
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 26(c)(1)(G).
136 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70246, at *31 (S.D.N.Y.).
137 See Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
138 Merriam Webster, Subpoena, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/subpoena (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
139 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i).
140 Insulate America v. Masco Corp., 227 F.R.D. 427, 432 (W.D.N.C. 2005) (citations omitted).
132
133
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sought, the requesting party’s need, and the potential hardship to the party
subject to the subpoena.”141
Altogether, the numerous rules that govern the FDA’s submission of
information, FOIA requests, the FDA’s use, the common law right of public
access, and discovery requests could each pose a threat to manufacturers who
wish to protect their bioequivalency tests via trade secret law. Nevertheless,
there are various situations in which a competing drug manufacturer could
attempt to access a bioequivalency test protected by trade secret law, as next
explained in Part III. These situations include disclosure requests from third
parties,142 threats of disclosure or use by the FDA,143 and the threat of
disclosure during litigation through the assertion of common law right of public
access or a discovery request.144 A generic manufacturer seeking to protect its
bioequivalency test via trade secret law should pay close attention to the way
courts define the scope of trade secret and the various methods that
competitors can use to seek disclosure of trade secret information.
III. ANALYSIS
Given Momenta’s holding that the safe harbor provision of the HatchWaxman Act encompasses a drug manufacturer’s use of another’s
bioequivalency testing methods for pre-clinical research and manufacturing,
patent law offers little to no protection for generic manufacturers who wish to
protect their bioequivalency tests from appropriation by competitors.145
Because FDA regulations of ANDAs are complex and require each
manufacturer to make a specific showing of how it meets the requirements to
legally manufacture a drug, as discussed above, the FDA requires generic drug
manufacturers to disclose their bioequivalency testing methods to ensure that a
drug in production is both safe and effective.146 Due to the extensive
information required by the FDA, ANDAs are therefore expensive to produce.
Moreover, since bioequivalency tests can be difficult, time consuming, and
expensive to develop, generic manufacturers often use patent protection to
141 Dorel Juvenile Grps., Inc. v. Summer Infant, Inc., C 06-91 S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77906
(D.R.I. Oct. 11, 2006) (quoting Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).
142 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
143 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (involving a similar situation in the
Environmental Protection Agency).
144 See Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788 (S.D.N.Y.).
145 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Rader, J., dissenting).
146 See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text.
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make investment in bioequivalency testing methods worthwhile. However,
after the Momenta holding, adequate patent protection of bioequivalency tests
has been lost, leaving generic manufacturers little incentive to invest in their
development. Nevertheless, trade secret law endures to protect generic drug
manufacturers’ bioequivalency tests from appropriation by competitors. This
Note argues that trade secret is in fact the best and most natural method for
protecting bioequivalency tests after Momenta, and therefore seeks to advise
generic drug manufacturers of the potential hurdles to overcome in gaining
such protection.
This section first discusses the scope of the definition of trade secret in
various contexts, keeping in mind that competitors who seek the information
will try to attack the definitions of both the UTSA and the FDA. Next, this
section explores the different ways for generic manufacturers to overcome
potential threats of misappropriation, in particular by jumping three different
anticipated hurdles to trade secret protection. These hurdles are: a FOIA
request made by a third party, potential use and disclosure of protected
information via FDA regulations, and disclosure during litigation via the
common law right of public access and the discovery process. Finally, this
section argues how each of these potential threats to protecting bioequivalency
tests can be avoided.
A. THE SCOPE OF THE DEFINITION OF “TRADE SECRET”

Before seeking trade secret protection for a bioequivalency testing method,
it is important to look at the exact definition of “trade secret” in order to
understand exactly what can be protected. As was explored above, there are
different working definitions of what constitutes a trade secret, and each is
important different contexts.147 Generic manufacturers seeking to protect their
bioequivalency tests via trade secret law should this to make sure to distinguish
these definitions from each other and understand when each definition applies.
Two of the relevant definitions of trade secret are the UTSA definition148 and
the FDA’s definition.149
A bioequivalency testing method would be considered a ‘trade secret’ for the
purposes of both the UTSA and the FDA’s definitions. The UTSA has a broad
definition of “trade secret,” including formulas, methods, techniques, or
processes.150 Similarly the FDA, defines a trade secret as, “[A]ny commercial
147
148
149
150

See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92.
21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2013). See also supra note 93.
See supra note 92.
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valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be
the end product of either innovation or substantial effort.”151 A bioequivalency
test would easily classify as a trade secret under either of these definitions as a
formula is used for the purposes of demonstrating that a generic drug is the
bioequivalent of, or the same as, the name brand.152 Since bioequivalency
testing methods should meet either the UTSA or FDA definition of trade
secret, generic manufacturers do retain an incentive for economic investment in
their development, despite the inadequacy of patent protection to do the same
after the Momenta court’s holding.
B. THE THREAT OF DISCLOSURE

Once a generic manufacturer decides to protect bioequivalency test as a
trade secret, there are three potential ways in which a generic drug
manufacturer’s trade secret could be disclosed: first, through a FOIA request;
second, through use by the FDA itself; and third, through an assertion of the
common law right of public access during the discovery process of litigation.
1. Overcoming the Threat of Disclosure Via a FOIA Request. The D.C. Circuit’s
discussion of the scope of trade secret protection in the FOIA context in Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration demonstrates that this
scope is broad enough to protect bioequivalency tests.153 In Public Citizen
Health, the plaintiff consumer advocacy group sought information from the
FDA regarding the safety and effectiveness of an intraocular lens that had been
on the market for several years.154 The manufacturer of the intraocular lenses
submitted clinical test results to the FDA, and the manufacturer objected to the
disclosure of these results to the petitioner, who had made a FOIA request for
them.155 The court was asked to determine whether the requested records were
“immune from disclosure under Exemptions 3 and 4 of the FOIA.”156 As the
court explained, “[t]hese exemptions allow the court to withhold, respectively,
(1) records that are ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by statute’ if the
relevant statute satisfies one of two limiting conditions and (2) ‘trade secrets and

21 C.F.R. § 20.61.
See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(discussing the “sufficient information [needed] to establish that the generic drug has the same
active ingredients as the reference drug”).
153 Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
154 Id. at 1283.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1282.
151
152
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commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.”157 In affirming in part and reversing in part, the D.C. Circuit held
that the district court “erred in its application of Exemption 3 and adopted an
overly broad construction of the term ‘trade secrets’ in Exemption 4”;
therefore, the court partially granted the petitioner’s request for the drug
manufacturer’s clinical test results.158
The court’s discussion of Exemption 4, and more specifically whether “the
requested documents constitute ‘trade secrets’ [and are therefore] exempt from
disclosure”159 illustrates that manufacturers can shield bioequivalency tests from
third parties urging disclosure through a FOIA request by protecting them as
trade secrets. After evaluating several different definitions of “trade secrets” at
common law, and finding that the Restatement of Torts’s expansive
definition160 “would classify virtually all undisclosed health and safety testing
data as trade secrets,”161 the court settled on a more restrictive definition to
adopt in FOIA cases.162 “Defined in its narrower common law sense,” a trade
secret is “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that
is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation of
substantial effort.”163 In arguing that this is the best definition of trade secret,
the court stated that it “incorporates a direct relationship between the
information at issue and the productive process.”164
Although the court in Public Citizen Health chose the more restrictive
definition of trade secret, believing that it “hews more closely to language and
legislative intent of FOIA than does the Restatement approach,”165 this definition
can still be used to protect bioequivalency testing methods. A bioequivalency
testing method should qualify as a trade secret because it is “a commercially

Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), (4).
Public Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1282.
159 Id. at 1286; see also 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4).
160 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“A trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”). The
definition of ‘trade secret’ as specified in the Restatement has been adopted by other courts. See,
e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
161 Public Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1286 (quoting Thomas McGarity & Sidney Shapiro, The
Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 837, 861 (1980)).
162 Id. at 1286–87.
163 Id. at 1288.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1289.
157
158
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valuable . . . formula . . . that is used for the making of trade commodities” i.e.,
a prescription drug, that is the “product of either innovation or substantial
effort.”166 There is no doubt that a bioequivalency test would be considered
“commercially valuable”; the competing generic manufacturer in Momenta, for
example, was able to make over $260 million per quarter after using the patent
holder’s bioequivalency test.167 Furthermore, a bioequivalency test certainly
qualifies as a formula, as it is used for the making of pharmaceutical drugs,
which also constitute “trade commodities.” There is also a direct relationship
between the bioequivalency testing methods and the productive process of
manufacturing drugs, unlike the information requested in Public Citizen Health.168
Thus, even under the more restrictive definition of ‘trade secret’ as used by the
D.C. Circuit and some other courts in determining the possibility of disclosure
via a FOIA request, a generic manufacturer should be able to protect
bioequivalency tests as trade secrets and will be immune from disclosure under
Exemption 4 of FOIA.169
2. Overcoming Threats of Disclosure Via the FDA’s Use and Disclosure of Trade
Secrets. In addition to FOIA requests, competitors could potentially gain access
to bioequivalency tests protected by trade secret law through the FDA’s own
use and disclosure of the protected information. While it is true that
bioequivalency test trade secrets would have to be disclosed to the FDA in
order to submit an ANDA, generic manufacturers should be assured that the
FDA can only disclose protected information to third parties under limited
circumstances.170
The Supreme Court addressed the question of when an agency may use and
disclose information that is freely submitted by a manufacturer seeking agency
approval to produce a product in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,171 whose reasoning can
be applied to bioequivalency tests to demonstrate that the scope of trade secret
protection is broad enough to prevent the FDA from disclosing the
information. The issue in the case was whether a pesticide manufacturer who
submitted an application for market approval of its pesticide to the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could claim trade secret protection

Id.
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
168 See 704 F.2d at 1290 (“[W]e conclude that [the records at issue] are not protected under the
first prong of Exception 4. The relationship of the requested information to the productive
process is tangential at best . . . .”).
169 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4).
170 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
171 Id. at 990.
166
167
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for health and safety information submitted as part of the application.172
Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA), which gave the EPA the authority to regulate the sale of pesticides.173
In order to market a pesticide in the United States, a manufacturer must gain
EPA approval,174 which parallels the requirement that a generic manufacturer
must have FDA approval in order to market a generic drug.
Monsanto, a company that developed and manufactured pesticides,
submitted an application to the EPA for approval to market a new chemical.175
Throughout the application process, Monsanto took special care to protect
health and safety data that they used to test the chemical.176 The company
spent approximately $23.6 million in order to generate this information, and did
not want the EPA to use it to test other chemicals.177 Under the FIFRA statute,
however, the EPA was allowed to use information submitted for the
registration of a pesticide to evaluate subsequent applications, and the statute
also allowed the EPA to publicly disclose some of the submitted information.178
The statute was silent with regard to the disclosure of health and safety
information, which the manufacturer was seeking to protect.179 The stakes of
the case were raised because like developing and marketing a generic drug,180
manufacturing a pesticide requires expenditures of between five and fifteen
million dollars annually over several years.181 When the EPA tried to use and
disclose Monsanto’s health and safety information, the company sued, claiming
that the EPA’s use of its health and safety data constituted a taking and was
prohibited under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.182
The Supreme Court asked whether Monsanto had a property interest in the
health and safety data, and if it did, whether the EPA’s use of the data
Id. at 998.
61 Stat. 163 (1947), codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012).
174 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991.
175 Id. at 997–98.
176 Id. at 998.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 990.
179 Id. at 991.
180 Although the cost of developing and manufacturing a generic drug is only about 15% of the
price of developing and manufacturing a new, brand name drug (Facts about Generic Drugs, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedici
nesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm167991.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2012)), manufacturing
a generic can still cost between $120–$150 million (ABC News, Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profits and the
Public Health, ABC TELEVISION BROAD., May 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File).
181 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998.
182 Id. at 1001; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”).
172
173
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constituted a taking.183 Because Monsanto asserted that the data was a trade
secret, the Court chose the Restatement of Torts’ definition of ‘trade secret’ for
the purposes of deciding the case.184 According to the Restatement, a trade
secret is “any . . . compilation of information which is used in one’s business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it.”185 The Court found that Monsanto did have a
property right protectable by the Fifth Amendment in the data.186 However,
the Court also ruled that, “[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to
a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly
be called a taking.”187 In other words, because Monsanto was on notice during
some of the relevant statutory period that the EPA could use the information to
evaluate other chemicals and could subject it to public disclosure, the EPA’s use
of the information could not constitute a taking for the purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. The Court further noted that some of the EPA’s disclosure of
health and safety information constituted a taking,188 because Monsanto
classified the submitted information as a trade secret, which, for a certain period
before the statute was amended, was permitted.189
Ruckelshaus offers a lesson to generic drug manufacturers about the limits of
the protection offered by trade secret law for their bioequivalency tests. So
long as a bioequivalency test meets the appropriate requirements for a trade
secret under the Restatement of Torts, a manufacturer has a property interest in
the test.190 This is important because if the test constitutes property, then some
immunity against disclosure would apply, and the FDA will not have freedom
to disclose the information to whomever asks. However, the holding of
Ruckelshaus indicates that this exclusion right is not unlimited and that courts
would likely be unsympathetic to a generic manufacturer who submitted
information to the FDA knowing that the FDA was able to use and disclose
certain information.191 Thus, it is important for generic manufacturers to take
precautions demonstrating the value of a bioequivalency test and its utmost

183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000.
Id. at 1001.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b).
Id. at 1003–04.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1003–04.
See id. at 1007.
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importance to the process of manufacturing a generic drug, as did the petitioner
in Ruckelshaus with the health and safety information pertaining to its pesticide.
Section 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations is particularly instructive as to
the FDA’s rights to information submitted to it by generic drug
manufacturers.192 The FDA’s policy is to make the fullest disclosure of
information possible, except when the information falls into a protected
category, one of which is a trade secret.193 For this reason, it is important that
drug manufacturers classify bioequivalency tests as trade secrets from the time
of their first application for FDA approval. Furthermore, the court will often
ascertain the actual value of submitted information by looking at the submitter’s
own efforts to protect it,194 so generic manufacturers should take measures to
protect the submitted information. For example, in Ruckelshaus, the Court
noted, “Monsanto has instituted stringent security measures to ensure the
secrecy of the data.”195 Thus, if generic manufacturers take steps to protect
their bioequivalency tests from disclosure before the information is submitted
to the FDA, this evidence of the tests’ value would cut in favor of the
manufacturer were the FDA to consider disclosure. While the Ruckelshaus
Court noted that “the Trade Secrets Act is not a guarantee of confidentiality to
submitters of data,”196 classifying information as a trade secret before submitting
the information to the FDA can offer the submitter greater protection.
3. Overcoming Potential Litigation-Related Threats of Disclosure Right of Public
Access. In addition to the threats of disclosure posed by FOIA requests and
FDA use of the information, litigation proceedings, and specifically discovery
requests, pose a third potential threat of disclosure. For example, if a generic
manufacturer were to be sued by a competitor or third party, the generic
manufacturer will be concerned that a bioequivalency trade secret could be
subject to disclosure through a discovery request. While the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure contain specific provisions to protect litigating parties from the
disclosure of trade secrets during the discovery process,197 generic
manufacturers will want to take special precautions in order to receive full
protection for their bioequivalency tests. Case law can additionally protect a

192
193
194
195
196
197

See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–104 and accompanying text.
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1008.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G); id. § 45(d)(3)(B).
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generic manufacturer’s bioequivalency tests from litigation-related threats of
disclosure.198
The threat of trade secret disclosure posed by the discovery process can be
very serious because of the common law right of public access.199 As the court
notes in Nycomed, “The courts have long recognized a common law right of
public access to judicial documents.”200 The primary theory behind the doctrine
of the right of public access is related to the desire for the general public to
perceive the court as an independent and legitimate body.201 The Second
Circuit has noted, “The political branches of government claim legitimacy by
election, judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial
process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and
requires rigorous justification.”202 Thus, courts are strict about maintaining
public access to judicial documents in order to maintain legitimacy and provide
information for the general public. However, the court’s desire conflicts with a
generic drug manufacturer’s interest in keeping information about
bioequivalency tests hidden.
If a trade secret cannot withstand the common law right of public access,
trade secret protection is of little use to generic manufacturers who face a
discovery request by an opposing party for documents containing information
related to bioequivalency testing methods. Although the common law right of
public access can make the process of protection tricky for generic
manufacturers, generic manufacturers can use the Second Circuit’s three part
test to determine whether a judicial document should be susceptible to the
common law right of public access203 in order to argue against disclosure.
The Second Circuit has stated that when judicial documents are requested,
the presumption is that they are susceptible to public access.204 Courts do err
on the side of disclosure, but the common law right of public access is not
absolute.205 The Second Circuit’s test to determine whether a judicial document
is subject to the common law right of public access, as mentioned previously,
involves three steps206: “First, the court must determine whether the documents
are indeed judicial documents . . . Second, if the documents are judicial
198 See, e.g., Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023(CBA), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20788 (E.D.N.Y.).
199 Id.
200 Id. at *7 (quoting Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
201 Id.
202 Id. (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008)).
203 See supra notes 128–29.
204 See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–49 (2d Cir. 1995).
205 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’s, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
206 Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). See also supra notes 128–29.
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documents, the court must determine the weight of the presumption [of
disclosure]. . . . Third, once the weight of the presumption is determined, a
court must balance competing considerations against it.”207
It is likely that, were the situation to arise, a generic manufacturer could
successfully argue that a bioequivalency test protected as a trade secret should
not be susceptible to the common law right of public access under the Second
Circuit’s analysis.208 Looking at the first factor—“whether the documents were
judicial documents to which the public had a right of access”209—a
manufacturer could likely end the inquiry here. The definition of “judicial
documents,” as discussed in Part II.C,210 is “relevant documents which are
submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course
of adjudicatory proceedings, [and] become documents to which the
presumption of public access applies.”211 Thus, the only way that the definition
would apply is if the documents with the relevant trade secret information were
requested by or submitted to a court, which is not likely to be necessary unless
the lawsuit concerns the bioequivalency testing method itself.
In addition, even if a court does request documents containing trade secrets,
generic manufacturers could argue against disclosure based on the theory
behind the common law right itself. For example, if the goal of this doctrine of
the right to public access is to portray the court as a legitimate and independent
body that can be trusted and respected, then the disclosure of a document upon
which a manufacturer has built its business could be harmful to the court’s
reputation. Inventors, manufacturers, and producers of lucrative goods would
hesitate to turn to the courts for a remedy if the court would simply disclose
their trade secrets to the first person who asks.
Turning to the second factor, “the weight of the presumption of
disclosure,”212 a generic manufacturer would again have a strong argument
against disclosure. As the court notes, “[T]he weight of the presumption
depends on the ‘role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial
power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the

207 Stern, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoted in Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788 (E.D.N.Y.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 See supra notes 128–29.
209 See supra notes 128–29.
210 See supra note 127.
211 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting FTC v.
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987)).
212 Stern, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 420.
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federal courts.’ ”213 In other words, due to the high value of a bioequivalency
test being kept a secret from competing manufacturers, the presumption of
disclosure by the court would not be high and would favor the position of a
generic manufacturer. The court further states the inquiry is often based largely
on whether the information sought to be disclosed is germane to the litigation,
especially if the information is used for a motion to dismiss.214 Thus, for the
purposes of a generic manufacturer protecting a bioequivalency test, unless the
test itself was of central importance to the litigation, the presumption would
weigh in favor of nondisclosure. Furthermore, keeping in mind the purpose of
the doctrine, it makes sense that the presumption is stronger when the
information is related to a motion to dismiss, because if the court dismisses a
case based on a motion, it needs to show good cause for the dismissal.
Finally, when looking at the third factor—competing considerations against
the presumption215—it is likely that the generic manufacturer would be able to
win the battle over disclosure at this step, if they could not do so via steps one
or two. As mentioned above, if courts will disclose lucrative, competitiondriving methods and formulas to the public during litigation, generic
manufacturers seeking protection will not seek judicial remedies. Furthermore,
a manufacturer’s active and vigorous defense of a trade secret is itself evidence
of its value. If public disclosure via the common law right of public access
causes the generic manufacturer to lose its competitive advantage, as well as the
millions of dollars it invested in development of the secret,216 the presumption
would favor disclosure. As demonstrated in Momenta, bioequivalency tests offer
a competitive advantage to generic companies who develop them.217 Because
so much of the generic manufacturer’s competitive advantage is stored in the
bioequivalency test, the court would be reticent to subject this precious and
valuable information to judicial disclosure.
For example, in Nycomed, the defendant sought to have the plaintiff’s brief
containing motions to amend the pleadings exempted from the common law
right of public access, as the brief allegedly contained information that the
defendant considered confidential.218 Defendant Glenmark argued that because
213 Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023(CBA), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20788, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d
Cir. 1995)) (internal citations omitted).
214 Id.
215 Id. at *8.
216 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
217 Id.
218 Nycomed, 2010 U.S. District LEXIS 20788, at *12.
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two paragraphs of the plaintiff’s motion contained confidential information
related to Glenmark’s ANDA, this information was exempt from public
disclosure.219 The court, however, disagreed. This situation is easily
distinguishable from the hypothetical situation in which a third party is invoking
the doctrine of public access against a generic manufacturer with the hope of
gaining access to a bioequivalency test protected via trade secret law, because
information protected as trade secret would not be found in an opposing party’s
brief to start with, if it was actually a secret. In Nycomed, the defendant sought
to protect information contained in the plaintiff’s brief; surely an opposing
party’s motion to amend the pleadings should not contain information related
to a vigorously protected trade secret in the first place, if the alleged trade secret
were really a secret. After reviewing the FDA’s relevant provisions regarding
the disclosure of pending ANDA’s, the court notes, “Certainly, any information
that is already public, or is independently made public, cannot be deemed
confidential.”220 The court also noted that the FDA’s regulations guarded only
against disclosure by the FDA and not the common law right of public
access.221 Thus, so long as the generic manufacturer actually treats the
bioequivalency test information allegedly within the scope of the common law
right of public access as a legitimate secret, the presumption against disclosure
during litigation should cut in favor of the generic manufacturer.
In addition to the potential for disclosure due to a competitors assertion of
the common law doctrine of public access during litigation, the discovery rules
could also pose a legitimate threat to generic manufacturers who seek to protect
their bioequivalency tests. As several cases have noted, there is no absolute
privilege which protects trade secrets from disclosure under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.222 However, many cases have noted that courts should try
to avoid unnecessary disclosure of trade secrets during discovery.223 Rules 26
and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure both discuss ‘trade secrets,’224
and often work together to protect parties from disclosure.225
In Massey Coal Services, Inc., for example, the court explained the
circumstances under which a court can issue a protective order pursuant to Rule
Id. at *15.
Id. at *16.
221 Id.
222 Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
223 Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. 420, 422 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
224 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45; see also text accompanying notes 131–36 for a review of rules 26
and 45.
225 See generally In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MO-1789(JCF), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70246, at *30 (S.D.N.Y.).
219
220
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26(c)(1)(G) to prevent a party from having to disclose a trade secret during the
discovery stage of litigation.226 The plaintiff, Massey Coal, sued defendant,
Victaulic, for various counts of breach of contract and misrepresentation.227
The defendants manufactured and installed piping that the plaintiff used in its
coalmines; when the pipes failed, the defendants admitted there was a problem
but would not provide further information.228 Before the hearing, the judge
issued a protective order for “documents or other materials . . . subject to
disclosure . . . [that are] confidential and should not be disclosed other than in
connection with this action.”229 The defendant disclosed to the plaintiffs
several documents marked ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ per the protective order, a few
of which demonstrated that the defendants knew that a chemical used to make
the pipes was potentially causing the pipes to fail. Because the pipes were used
to carry drinking water throughout the county, the plaintiffs made a motion to
disclose the information to the Public Service Authority.230 The defendant
objected, invoking protection from Rule 26(c)(1)(G)231 and arguing that the
documents contained commercially valuable information.232 For the purposes
of analysis, the court noted that Rule 26(c)(1) “treats equally a trade secret or
other confidential commercial information.”
Ultimately, the trial judge held that the documents were not protectable via
Rule 26(c)(1),233 but the reasoning of the court is helpful in understanding the
scope of the protection offered under 26(c)(1). In order to get a protective
order for discovered documents under 26(c)(1), the party possessing the
documents must show “good cause” for protection, including, most relevantly,
“undue burden or expense.”234 Essentially, the defendants in this case argued
that “severe economic damage” would result from disclosure.235 However, the
court noted, “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific
examples . . . do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test. Moreover, the harm must be
significant, not a mere trifle.”236 Additionally, the court stated that the
Massey Coal Servs., Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 249 F.R.D. 477 (S.D.W. Va. 2008).
Id. at 478.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 479.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 482 (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
232 Id.
233 Id. at 484.
234 Id. at 480; Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing the
“standard for determining whether [d]efendants have shown good cause for a protective order”
(citations omitted))). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); supra text accompanying note 134.
235 Massey Coal Servs., Inc., 249 F.R.D. 477.
236 Id. at 481 (citation omitted).
226
227
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defendants had made no showing that they had undertaken efforts to keep the
documents a secret,237 that the defendants had not objected to disclosure of the
documents to the plaintiffs, that the documents were contained in the court’s
public record, and that the defendants did not file a motion to seal the
documents.238 In light of these facts, the court reasoned that the documents
were not commercially valuable and were not protectable.239 The trial judge
further stated that even if the disclosure of the documents to the state public
health authorities would cause embarrassment to the defendants, the
embarrassment was not a concern of the court and would not protect the
documents from disclosure.240
In light of the Massey court’s holding and reasoning, if a generic
manufacturer protecting a bioequivalency test via trade secret law wishes to
prevent disclosure via Rule 26(c)(1), it must show “good cause” for a protective
order by demonstrating “undue burden or expense.”241 The manufacturer
should provide the court with “specific examples or articulated reasoning”242
that disclosure of the trade secret would cause substantial economic harm to the
manufacturer. Further, the manufacturer should show that this harm will be
significant, and “not a mere trifle.”243 Generic manufacturers should also
consider factors commonly used to measure secrecy, found in the Restatement
of Torts. Such factors can include:
[T]he extent to which the information is known by employees
and others involved in the business . . . the extent of measures
taken by the business to guard the secrecy of the
information . . . the value of the information to the business and
to its competitors . . . and the amount of effort or money
expended in developing the information.244

Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
239 Id. at 482–83.
240 Id. at 484.
241 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1987); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(c)(1).
242 Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.
243 Id.
244 Massey Coal Servs., Inc., 249 F.R.D. at 482.
237
238
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Again, since bioequivalency tests take substantial time, effort, and funding to
create, they are critical to a generic manufacturer’s market competitiveness.245
Therefore, the manufacturer should take great care in maintaining their secrecy,
for example, by limiting the number of employees who have the formulas,
making employees sign confidentiality agreements and covenants not to
compete, and maintaining a financially reasonable amount of computer system
security. If a generic manufacturer is sued, it should be fairly simple to
demonstrate to the court that documents containing the specific bioequivalency
formula should either not be disclosed because they are not germane to the
lawsuit, or that they should be privileged and confidential due to their
economically valuable nature.
In addition, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,246 which
governs subpoenas, could also benefit a generic manufacturer seeking to protect
a bioequivalency test through trade secret law during litigation. A generic
manufacturer’s bioequialency test trade secret will lose its value if disclosed;
given the test’s high value, generic manufacturers will want to be aware of the
risk of being subpoenaed so that they can demonstrate, if necessary, why a
bioequivalency test trade secret should not be disclosed. When determining
whether or not to quash a subpoena that could potentially pose a threat of
disclosure to a generic manufacturer’s bioequivalency test trade secret, the court
will balance the burden of disclosure with the potential need/use of the
information.247
Although there is also no per se protection for trade secrets under Rule 45,
it is likely that a generic manufacturer would be able to withstand disclosure of a
bioequivalency test in the event of a subpoena. For example, In re Fosamax
demonstrates that drug manufacturers can make a variety of creative arguments
to successfully quash a subpoena that would result in disclosure. A group of
plaintiffs sued defendant drug company, Merck & Co., alleging that a drug they
manufactured, Fosamax, caused adverse side effects.248 The plaintiffs issued a
subpoena to Dr. Bruce Psaty from the National Academy of Sciences to testify
about a drug safety report that he conducted under the direction of the FDA.249

245 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
2013).
246 FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
247 See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
248 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MO-1789(JFK)(JLF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70246, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009).
249 Id. at *28.
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Dr. Psaty moved to quash the subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3)(B),250 alleging that
he never studied the drug in question;251 furthermore, the defendant urged that
even if Dr. Psaty testified, it was unclear whether he would be required to
disclose confidential information or trade secrets.252 In making its decision, the
court tried to balance the burden between necessity of the testimony and the
undue burden on the defendant to produce the information, ultimately
quashing the subpoena.253 In considering whether there is an undue burden on
the defendant, the court assesses the personal hardship to the party protecting
the information and the wider social consequences of disclosing the
information.254 Here, the court noted that if Dr. Psaty were required to testify,
“the resulting social impact would be far more serious. Compelling testimony
from a third party researcher risks chilling participation in beneficial public
research.”255 Thus, the court recognized the value of trade secrets, suggesting
other courts will also protect them from disclosure during the discovery process
by quashing a subpoena that would reveal them.
When comparing this case with the potential disclosure of a generic
manufacturer’s bioequivalency test, generic manufacturers who receive
subpoenas would likely not be required to disclose trade secrets if called to
testify. Even if the testimony sought were important to the case, the balancing
of the burden between necessity of the testimony and the undue burden placed
on the defendant would likely weigh in favor of quashing the subpoena. The
personal hardship to the generic manufacturer would be catastrophic, resulting
in the loss of millions of dollars in profits or the loss of commercial market
advantage.256 In addition, the consideration of wider social impact would weigh
in favor of suppressing the subpoena, because requiring generic drug
manufacturers to disclose trade secrets could have a chilling effect on beneficial
scientific research.
Generic manufacturers provide a valuable service to consumers by lowering
the cost of drugs. However, because the Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of
250 Id. at *27. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (“To protect a person subject to or
affected by a subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion,
quash or modify the subpoena if it requires: (i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information; or (ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s
opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the
expert’s study that was not requested by a party.”).
251 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70246, at *28.
252 Id. at *30.
253 Id. at *33–34.
254 Id. at *34.
255 Id. at *35.
256 See, e.g., Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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the safe harbor provision in Momenta v. Amphastar gives generic manufacturers
little protection for their bioequivalency tests through patent law,257 the
incentive to produce generic drugs will likely decrease if another method of
protection is not found. Although trade secret law does not provide per se
protection from disclosure,258 generic manufacturers could still find adequate
protection through trade secret law if they overcome the obstacles previously
mentioned in the context of FOIA requests, FDA use of the information, and
litigation.
Although FOIA encourages the broad disclosure of government-held
information, a generic manufacturer can demonstrate to the FDA’s FOIA
office that bioequivalency test trade secrets are immune from disclosure. The
generic manufacturer can point to the definition of trade secret adopted in
Public Citizen Health to argue that a bioequivalency text qualifies as a trade secret,
exempting it from disclosure. Generic manufacturers can also overcome the
threat of disclosure posed by the FDA’s potential use or disclosure of the
information, because the FDA is only allowed to disclose protected information
submitted to it by a third party under limited circumstances. Because generic
manufacturers have a property interest in their bioequivalency test trade secrets,
the FDA has a limited amount of power to disclose this information; so long as
a generic manufacturer treats the bioequivalency test as a trade secret, the threat
of disclosure by the FDA is manageable. Finally, litigation-related threats of
disclosure, specifically the common law right of public access and discovery
requests made by parties to a litigation, can also be overcome by generic
manufacturers. The test developed by the Second Circuit in Stern v. Cosby can
be used to show that the presumption in favor of disclosure present in the
common law right of public access can be avoided by generic manufacturers
protecting bioequivalency tests as trade secrets.
Furthermore, generic
manufacturers could also protect their bioequivalency test trade secrets from
disclosure via discovery requests through the protection offered by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45. This Note has therefore demonstrated that
generic manufacturers could successfully protect their bioequivalency research
and development investments from use by competitors through the use of trade
secret law.

Id. at 1361.
United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 42 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that
“trade secrets and other confidential commercial information enjoy no privilege from disclosure
although courts may choose to protect such information”).
257
258
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IV. CONCLUSION
Altogether, this Note has explored the impact and the consequences of the
recent holding in Momenta and one potential solution to the problems created by
the Federal Circuit.259 The Momenta majority held that a generic manufacturer
who uses the patented bioequivalency test of a competitor is protected from
liability by way of the safe harbor provision of the Hatch Waxman Act.260 As
Chief Judge Rader points out in his dissent, the majority’s holding effectively
renders all patents on bioequivalency testing methods worthless,261 an effect
confirmed by later proceedings.262 In light of the Momenta holding, generic
manufacturers are now in need of a way to protect their bioequivalency testing
methods from use by their competitors. This Note has demonstrated that
trade secret law can provide a viable alternative to patent protection for generic
manufacturers, at least in the absence of any action by Congress to address the
Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of the safe harbor provision in Momenta v.
Amphastar.
Generic manufacturers can protect their bioequivalency tests through trade
secret law by overcoming obstacles in three potentially threatening contexts.
Generic manufacturers can overcome the threat of disclosure from a FOIA
request by arguing that bioequivalency tests fit within the scope of the
definition of “trade secret” and constitute commercially valuable information.
Second, generic manufacturers can withstand the threat of disclosure through
the FDA’s own use of the information by again arguing that a bioequivalency
test constitutes a trade secret, under the specific FDA definition and by
showing positive steps taken to treat the information as a secret, meeting the
Second Circuit’s test. Third, generic manufacturers can address the threat
arising from the common law right of public access by arguing that the purpose
of the right is for the public to view the court as a legitimate institution, and
that this purpose would be defeated if the court disclosed a manufacturer’s
extremely valuable information to competitors. Finally, generic manufacturers
can use trade secret law to protect bioequivalency tests despite the threat of
disclosure from litigation by invoking Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c)
against discovery requests for documents and Rule 45 against subpoenas.
Ideally, Congress will recognize the Federal Circuit’s unfortunate holding in
Momenta with corrective legislation to restore the power of patent protection to

259
260
261
262

Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).
See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.).
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generic manufacturers. However, in the meantime, or indefinitely into the
future if necessary, trade secret law can provide an alternative to patent
protection for generic manufacturers who desire to protect their bioequivalency
tests from the hungry eyes of their competitors.
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